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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

APPLYING PADILLA IN MISSOURI IN THE MIDST OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER CRISIS

Occasionally, the heinousness of a crime, the seeming certainty of the
same result if the case is remanded, and the delay occasioned by remand tempt
one to wink at procedural defects. Nevertheless, the cornerstone of any
civilized system of justice is that the rules are applied evenly to everyone, no
1
matter how despicable the crime.

INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
guarantees many important procedural protections for an accused facing
criminal prosecution. Perhaps chief among these protections is the guarantee
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”2 Without a properly trained and
well-prepared advocate standing in the breach, an accused defendant may
unknowingly be stripped of the remainder of his or her rights. Consequently,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel guarantees more than mere presence.3 In a criminal prosecution, a
“defendant’s due process right to the assistance of counsel includes the
guaranty that such assistance be adequate, competent, and effective,”
regardless of “whether [the] attorney is one of [the] defendant’s choosing or
court-appointed.”4
Guilty pleas currently account for as much as ninety-five percent of all
convictions.5 Without such a high percentage of pleas, the time and costs of

1. State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 927 (Mo. 1996) (Holstein, C.J., dissenting). Ironically,
Nunley and Taylor were accomplices.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1604 (2005) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
(1980)).
4. Id. (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Fitzgerald v. Beto, 479 F.2d 420 (5th
Cir. 1973)).
5. John E.D. Larkin, A Proposed Framework for Evaluating Effectiveness of Counsel
Under Padilla v. Kentucky, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 565, 566 (2011); see also Missouri v. Frye,
132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four
percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, tbl.5.22.2009,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf (all internet materials as visited Mar. 1,
253
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trial would likely overwhelm the criminal justice system in many, if not most,
jurisdictions.6 Criminal defendants’ guilty pleas come at a high cost, resulting
in the waiver of many constitutional rights in addition to a stipulation of their
guilt.7 In an attempt to prevent defendants from giving up rights as a result of
undue pressure:
[C]ourts and legislatures have surrounded guilty pleas in layers of protections:
guilty pleas must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; there must be a
factual basis for each guilty plea; defendants are entitled to the assistance of
counsel prior to the entry of a guilty plea; and defendants must be informed of
8
[at least] the direct consequences of their plea.

These protections may suffice in theory, but the reality of the current system
casts doubt upon the ability of the criminal justice system to adequately
safeguard the constitutional rights of defendants, particularly those who rely
upon court-appointed public defenders. The public defender system in this
country is in peril.9 Unsustainable caseload levels and chronic underfunding
seriously threaten the ability of public defenders to provide the effective
assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.10 Without effective assistance
of counsel, the remaining constitutional rights of the most vulnerable
defendants are endangered.
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court took a great step towards
safeguarding criminal defendants’ right to effective assistance of counsel in
Padilla v. Kentucky.11 The Court held that to be considered constitutionally
effective, counsel must provide affirmative advice to clients of the deportation
consequences of a guilty plea.12 Many hope Padilla “may mark the beginning
of a change in constitutional law to account for the current realities” of a
system whose “criminal procedure as a whole has failed to adjust to meet the
imperatives of a system in which almost all convictions are obtained by plea
rather than through a trial.”13 However, Padilla left many questions

2012, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); S. Rosenmerkel, M. Durose, & D. Farole, U.S.
DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006–
Statistical Tables, p. 1 (NCJ226846, rev. Nov. 2010), http:// bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
fssc06st.pdf.
6. Larkin, supra note 5, at 565.
7. Id. (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
8. Id. at 566 (internal citations omitted).
9. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
11. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1473 (2010).
12. Id. at 1486.
13. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Taking Plea Bargaining Seriously: Reforming Pre-Sentence
Reports After Padilla v. Kentucky, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (citing
several articles from Stephanos Bibas, including Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-
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unanswered—including whether its decision is retroactive, the continued
viability, if any, of a distinction between the direct and collateral consequences
of a plea, and most significantly, whether its holding requires counsel to
provide affirmative advice on other consequences beyond deportation—
generating significant confusion in state and federal courts.14 Additionally, it is
difficult to see based on the Court’s opinion alone how its holding can be
effectively implemented in the current criminal justice system.
While it is no longer novel to cite Padilla v. Kentucky’s potential to alter
the legal landscape, the question of whether and how to extend Padilla’s
holding continues to be profoundly relevant.15 Missouri has not yet had the
opportunity to rule on whether Padilla applies to consequences beyond
deportation, however other courts have already begun applying its holding to
include an affirmative duty to provide advice regarding a myriad of potential
problems:16 post-release commitment hearings,17 loss of pension,18 sex
offender registration requirements,19 parole eligibility,20 and eligibility for
early release from prison for good behavior.21 Following the lead of the
concurring opinion in Webb v. State, this Article argues that Missouri should
apply Padilla’s holding to include affirmative advice regarding the sentencing
consequences resulting from a defendant’s choice to plead guilty, particularly
in the capital sentencing context.22 In addition to faithfully carrying out the
necessary implications of Padilla’s holding, the principle benefit of such an
application is that it represents another step towards meaningful enforcement
of criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. Absent such application, the
overwhelming majority of criminal defendants, especially those who plead
based on incomplete or erroneous advice from their attorneys, may ignorantly

Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117
(2011), discussed below).
14. Larkin, supra note 5, at 567.
15. As of, but not including, January 14, 2012, Padilla was 654 days old. At that time the
case had 2,344 citing references on Westlaw Next. That is approximately 3.6 citations each day
since the case was handed down.
16. See Travis Sterns, Intimately Related to the Criminal Process: Examining the
Consequences of a Conviction After Padilla v. Kentucky and State v. Sandoval, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 855, 856 (2011) (citing the examples listed in notes 17-21 below).
17. Id. (citing Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr. State of Fla., 619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010)).
18. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. 2010)).
19. Id. (citing Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)).
20. Id. (citing Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (holding based on state
law, but concurring opinion, discussed below, advocates extending Padilla); Frost v. State, No.
CR-09-1037, 2011 WL 2094777 (Ala. Crim. App. May 27, 2011); Pridham v. Commonwealth,
2008-CA-002190-MR, 2010 WL 4668961 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010)).
21. Id. (citing Stith v. State, No. CR-09-0754, 2011 WL 1604934 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 29,
2011)).
22. Webb, 334 S.W.3d at 139 (Wolff, J., concurring).
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and inadvertently deny themselves a remedy for the violation of their
constitutional rights when they enter a guilty plea.
To that end, this Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly examines the
Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla v. Kentucky, clarifying what
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel entails. Part II considers a
proposal to apply Padilla’s holding in Missouri to cover sentencing
consequences generally. Part III illustrates the persuasiveness of that proposed
application, especially in capital cases, through an examination of the case of
Michael Anthony Taylor. Having advocated for this application, Part IV
considers the impact of the added burden of such application on the public
defender system, proposes changes to the plea system to alleviate that burden,
envisions how these proposals could be unified in a reform framework, and
concludes with a hypothetical description of how such reforms would have
applied in Taylor’s case. The underlying goal of this Article is to help prevent
situations like Taylor’s, who, due to his attorneys’ omission, pleaded guilty
based on incomplete and incorrect knowledge of his sentencing options.23 For
more than twenty years, despite confessing to his underlying guilt, Taylor has
continued to challenge the validity of his alleged waiver24 and the effectiveness
of his counsel.25 Those twenty years, representing a continual violation of
Taylor’s constitutional rights, a lack of closure for his victim’s family, and a
phenomenal waste of judicial resources, could have and should have been
prevented. The proposed application of Padilla and corresponding reforms to
accommodate that application would accomplish those goals.
I. REDEFINING CONSTITUTIONALLY EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
Jose Padilla was a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over
forty years when he was charged with felony drug distribution charges in
Kentucky.26 Padilla’s counsel failed to advise him of the nearly inevitable
consequences of a guilty plea, telling him not to worry about deportation since
he “had been in the country so long.”27 Based on this omission and further
misadvice, Padilla pleaded guilty to felony charges that “made his deportation
virtually mandatory.”28 Padilla insisted he would not have pleaded on those
terms but for the incorrect advice of his counsel.29 The Court agreed with

23. State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 653–54 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).
24. Id. at 634 (holding Taylor, despite his ignorance of its availability, waived jury
sentencing).
25. Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963, 972 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding Taylor’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim failed to meet the Strickland standard).
26. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010).
27. Id. at 1478.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Padilla that his counsel was ineffective and held that “constitutionally
competent counsel would have advised him that his [plea] made him subject to
automatic deportation.”30
The Court based its decision on two key rationales. First, for that class of
defendants—noncitizens—deportation is perhaps the most important part of
the punishment.31 Second, the unique nature of deportation is that it is a
“particularly severe ‘penalty’” that is a nearly automatic consequence of—and
thus “intimately related” to—the sentencing process.32 In light of these key
rationales, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel
outlined in Strickland v. Washington applied to Padilla’s claim.33
Before applying Strickland, the Court emphasized that “[t]he first prong—
constitutional deficiency—is necessarily linked to the practice and
expectations of the legal community: ‘The proper measure of attorney
performance [is] reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’”34 The
Court found that prevailing professional norms universally required attorneys
to advise of the risk of deportation.35 The failure to inform in Padilla’s case
was particularly egregious because the terms of the relevant statute were
“succinct, clear, and explicit” such that the essentially mandatory plea
consequences could easily have been determined “simply from reading the text
of the statute.”36 Arguably envisioning a wider application, the Court ruled in
more general terms:
When the law is not succinct and straightforward . . . a[n] . . . attorney need
[only] advise a noncitizen client [of the] risk of adverse immigration

30. Id. (holding this satisfied the first prong of the Strickland ineffective assistance of
counsel test, but refusing to address the second prejudice prong).
31. Padilla, 130 S. Ct at 1480.
32. Id. Due to its designation of deportation as “unique” in nature, the Court declined to
consider the propriety of the direct versus collateral consequence distinction utilized by most
courts prior to Padilla. Id. In addition to exempting such severe penalties, the Court took the extra
step to emphasize that it has never employed such a distinction in its Strickland cases. Id. This
Article assumes the consequences of error in capital sentencing cases, of greater severity than
deportation, would similarly be considered unique in nature and exempted from the direct versus
collateral distinction.
33. Id. at 1482. Strickland’s ineffective assistance of counsel test requires two steps.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The test first requires a determination that
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. If the answer is
yes, it must be determined whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
34. Padilla, 130 S. Ct at 1482 (citing “American Bar Association standards and the like” as
guides for determining reasonableness).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1483.
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consequences[,] [b]ut when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it
37
was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.

In announcing this rule, the Court refused to limit its holding to affirmative
misadvice, seeing no difference in this context between acts of commission
(affirmative misadvice) and omission (silence).38 This decision was motivated
by two concerns. First, a contrary decision would create an incentive for
attorneys to remain silent contrary to their duty to advise their clients of the
advantages and disadvantages of a guilty plea.39
Second, it would deny a class of clients least able to represent themselves the
most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily available. It is
quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with available advice
about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so “clearly satisfies the
40
first prong of the Strickland analysis.”

The Court concluded that its Sixth Amendment precedents and the
“seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea” demanded
that counsel must inform a client “whether his plea carries a risk of
deportation.”41 Having held that Padilla met Strickland’s first prong, the Court
then remanded his case for determination of whether Padilla suffered prejudice
as a result.42 It is significant that the Court prefaced its holding with a
reaffirmation of its constitutional responsibility: “to ensure that no criminal
defendant . . . is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”43
II. A PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL FOR APPLYING PADILLA IN MISSOURI
In Missouri, the debate over the scope and consequences of Padilla has
just begun.44 Although it is unknown how Missouri will ultimately interpret
Padilla, the concurring opinion in a recent Missouri Supreme Court case,
Webb v. State, offers a compelling argument that Padilla should be applied to

37. Id.
38. Id. at 1484.
39. Padilla, 130 S. Ct at 1484.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1486.
42. Id. at 1487.
43. Id. at 1486 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
44. So far, only three Missouri appellate cases (as of the date of this writing) cite Padilla:
Webb v. State, 334 S.W3d 126 (Mo. 2011) (discussed below); Smith v. State, 353 S.W.3d 1 (Mo.
Ct. App. E.D. 2011) (rejecting an ineffective assistance claim based on counsel’s failure to advise
the defendant of the sentencing consequences of his guilty plea, noting Webb discussed Padilla’s
potential impact on sentencing consequences but deciding the case on other grounds); and State v.
Rasheed, 340 S.W.3d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2011) (acknowledging in a footnote that in
Missouri Padilla’s holding has not been applied beyond deportation).
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the sentencing consequences of a guilty plea.45 Eric Webb pleaded guilty based
on his attorney’s affirmative misadvice that he would not be subject to a
mandatory minimum sentencing law requiring him to serve eighty-five percent
of his sentence prior to parole eligibility.46 His attorney was incorrect and
Webb immediately filed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.47 In a per
curiam opinion, the court held that “where counsel misinforms the client as to
the effects of the client’s plea, the counsel has rendered ineffective
representation.”48 Because this conclusion was supported by Missouri
caselaw,49 the court did not reach the question of “whether Padilla applies to
other consequences such as parole eligibility.”50
Judge Michael A. Wolff51 addressed that question in a concurring opinion
in Webb, concluding that a faithful reading of Padilla inevitably has broader
implications beyond deportation consequences for what constitutes effective
assistance of counsel.52 Wolff argued that Padilla requires a professional
obligation to inform clients of the truly clear consequences of guilty pleas;
court recognition that “reciting the usual no-threats-no-promises litany at
sentencing does not necessarily ensure that the plea is voluntary;” and
reassessment of whether a plea can truly be considered voluntary if a defendant
is “not informed of the other inevitable consequences of his plea.”53 “[H]ow,”
Wolff cites as an example, “can Webb be satisfied with his attorney’s legal
services54 if he did not know that his attorney misinformed or failed to inform
him that he would be required to spend at least 85 percent of his sentence
behind bars?”55

45. Webb, 334 S.W.3d at 140 (Wolff, J., concurring). This Article assumes, following Webb
and others that Padilla applies retroactively based on the Court’s rejection of the “floodgates”
arguments. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485; see also, e.g., Webb, 334 S.W.3d at 136, 136 n.8;
Larkin, supra note 5, at 567, 567 n.20.
46. Webb, 334 S.W.3d at 126–27.
47. Id. at 127.
48. Id.
49. The court’s precedent states “the failure to inform a client about parole eligibility does
not render the attorney’s representation ineffective.” Id. at 127 (citing Reynolds v. State, 994
S.W.2d 944, 946 (Mo.1999)). However, that same precedent indicates that “a plea may be
considered involuntary if counsel misinforms the client as to the effects of the plea” and the
appellate courts’ practice has been to hold that “counsel’s misinformation renders the
representation ineffective.” Id. The court adopted this position and found Webb was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. Id..
50. Id. at 131 n.8.
51. Judge Wolff, now retired from the bench, has resumed teaching full-time at Saint Louis
University School of Law.
52. Webb, 334 S.W.3d at 131, 134 (Wolff, J., concurring; Teitleman & Stith, JJ., joining).
53. Id.
54. Part of the standard plea litany the court uses to confirm the validity of a plea. Id.
55. Id.
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Following this logic, Wolff argues that misinforming or failing to inform a
defendant of the sentencing consequences of a guilty plea, including minimum
prison terms and parole eligibility, should be considered a constitutionally
deficient performance in light of Padilla.56 Wolff bases this argument, in part,
on the “similar characteristics” of deportation and such sentencing
consequences.57 While deportation is “practically inevitable” for defendants
like Padilla, minimum prison terms are required in Missouri if a defendant
pleads guilty to certain offenses.58 Both parole eligibility and deportation are
“severe results that are intimately related to the criminal process.”59
Misinforming or failing to inform a client regarding both consequences
violates the practice expectations of the legal community as outlined by
prevailing professional norms.60 In particular, Wolff cites the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association’s (NLADA) Compendium of Standards for
Indigent Defense Systems requirement that “prior to the entry of the plea,
counsel should . . . make certain that the client fully and completely
understands . . . the consequences the accused will be exposed to by entering a
plea.”61 Based on these parallels, Wolff concludes that like deportation in
Padilla, “counsel has a duty to inform—not just a duty to avoid misleading the
client” and that this duty should include the truly clear sentencing
consequences of a guilty plea as well.62 Consequently, the failure to inform a
client of the sentencing consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel, satisfying Strickland’s first prong.63
III. BUILDING ON WEBB: ILLUSTRATING THE PERSUASIVENESS OF APPLYING
PADILLA
The Webb concurrence focused on parole eligibility and mandatory
minimum sentences because, for defendants like Webb who will become
eligible for parole, those and other post-release consequences are likely the
most important sentencing consequences of their guilty pleas. Defendants
considering guilty pleas in capital cases in Missouri have different concerns
since they will be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 136.
Webb, 334 S.W.3d. at 136.
Id. at 136–37.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. (citing to 2 NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER’S ASS’N, COMPENDIUM OF
STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE
(2000), http://www.mynlada.org/defender/DOJ/standardsv2/v2h.htm [hereinafter NLADA,
COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS].
62. Webb, 334 S.W.3d. at 138.
63. Id. (remanding for a hearing to determining whether Webb suffered prejudiced as a
result).
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parole or death. For these defendants—those who are not eligible for parole or
release—the most important “sentencing consequences” of a guilty plea are the
procedural consequences of who will hear their case and impose their sentence.
As such, this Article considers both consequences to be “sentencing
consequences.” The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to both sets of
defendants, and following Padilla and Webb, constitutionally effective counsel
should include affirmative advice regarding the sentencing consequences most
important to each class of defendants. The case of Michael Anthony Taylor
illustrates the persuasiveness of this position.
A.

The Case of Michael Anthony Taylor: Background and Procedural
History

Michael Anthony Taylor confessed on video to the 1989 kidnap, rape, and
murder of a fifteen-year-old girl.64 Taylor reaffirmed this, under oath in open
court, in 1991 when he pleaded guilty to charges including first-degree murder,
knowing the State was seeking the death penalty.65 In Missouri, then, as now,
the sentencing scheme for a first-degree murder case where the death penalty is
not waived provides for a bifurcated trial conducted in two stages before the
same trier-of-fact.66 In the first stage, the trier-of-fact decides only whether the
defendant is guilty or not guilty of the charged offense.67 If the defendant is
found guilty in the first stage, then the trier-of-fact proceeds to the second
stage “at which the only issue shall be the punishment to be assessed and
declared.”68 At the penalty phase, in order to impose the death penalty, the
trier-of-fact must: (1) find the presence of statutory and non-statutory
aggravating circumstances; (2) determine these circumstances warrant death;
(3) consider whether mitigating circumstances exist and find, if they do exist,

64. State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Mo.1996).
65. State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 636–37 (Mo. 2011); Brief of Respondent
Troy Steele at 6, State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 636 (Mo 2011) (No. SC90925),
2010 WL 5570079 (Mo.).
66. State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 637; MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (1986). The only
update to the statute is the disallowance of independent judicial fact-finding in the event of jury
deadlock as unconstitutional in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding the
Sixth Amendment requires that “[c]apital defendants . . . [are entitled] to a jury determination of
any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.”). State v.
Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Mo. 2003).
67. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.2 (1986).
68. Id. at 565.030.4. This sentencing phase can be understood as answering two questions:
(1) Based on the laws of this jurisdiction, could this defendant be sentenced to death [eligibility
decision]; and (2) Based on the laws of this jurisdiction, should this defendant be sentenced to
death [selection decision]. LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT LAW 43 (2004).
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that they do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances;69 and (4) decide
under all of the circumstances to impose the death sentence.70 The decision
under the statute is thus a “weighing” procedure where, if the mitigating
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the trier-of-fact cannot
impose the death penalty but must instead sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment without parole.71 However, even if the aggravating
circumstances are found to outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a trier-offact need not impose the death penalty; the fourth step of the statutory scheme
allows a trier-of-fact to elect to impose life imprisonment rather than the death
penalty.72 The trier-of-fact is therefore free to choose mercy regardless of the
findings in the weighing process.73 If tried by a jury, the verdict must be
unanimous in order to recommend a sentence of death to the judge who
ultimately imposes the sentence.74 In Missouri, a defendant has one further
opportunity to receive mercy. Once the jury recommends a sentence the judge
has discretionary power to reduce that sentence within the statutory guidelines,
for instance, from death to life imprisonment.75
Then, as now, a defendant charged with homicide, facing a capital trial in
Missouri has three sentencing options: (1) they can face a jury for both phases;
(2) they can waive their Sixth Amendment rights and agree to submit all issues
(i.e. the bifurcated stages of guilt and punishment) to a judge as trier-of-fact; or
(3) they can elect to plead guilty to a judge and—with state permission—face a
jury for the punishment phase trial.76
Given the taped confession, Taylor and his two attorneys were concerned
about appearing to contest his guilt in the first phase, potentially inflaming the
trier-of-fact in advance of the punishment phase.77 Consequently, Taylor was

69. See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032 (1986) (outlining the statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances that must be considered).
70. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 256 (outlining the process required by section 565.030.4
(1994)).
71. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 68, at 53 (2004); State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at
643–44.
72. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 68, at 53–54; State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at
643–44. This step allows a trier-of-fact to exercise mercy.
73. CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 68, at 53–54; State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at
643–44.
74. State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 642. A defendant thus has twelve chances to receive
mercy.
75. State v. Anderson, 384 S.W.2d 591, 610 (Mo. 1964); see also Witherspoon v. State of
Ill., 391 U.S. 510, 525 n.2 (1968) (“In most of these States, a jury decision of death is binding on
the court. In a few States [such as Missouri], however, the judge may overrule the jury and
impose a life sentence.”) (citing State v. Anderson as an example of the minority position).
76. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.006 (1986).
77. State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 645.
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counseled to avoid the first phase entirely by pleading guilty.78 Based on this
advice, Taylor chose to waive his right to a jury trial, electing to plead his guilt
before a judge.79 A judge accepted Taylor’s waiver and guilty plea, and then
conducted a three-day punishment phase hearing.80 Pursuant to sections
565.030 and 565.032, Taylor was sentenced to death for first-degree murder
after the judge found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances.81
Both before and during his plea hearing, Taylor was informed of many
things.82 He was informed of most of the process and procedure described
above, he was informed of many of his rights, and he was informed that his
guilty plea would result in the waiver of his right to trial by jury and thus result
in one person, a judge, deciding whether to impose life imprisonment without
parole or the death sentence in the punishment phase.83 But what Taylor was
not informed of is of much greater significance. Taylor was only informed of
two of his three possible sentencing options.84 Taylor’s two attorneys failed to
inform him that he could plead guilty and seek a jury for sentencing pursuant
to section 565.006.2; one attorney was unaware the third option existed, and
the other, while allegedly aware of the statute, never thought to mention it.85
After receiving the death sentence, Taylor immediately filed a post-conviction
relief (PCR) action alleging his plea was involuntary because his counsel had
been ineffective.86 Taylor’s challenges to the effectiveness of his counsel and
corresponding validity of his plea have been repeatedly denied, resulting in
over twenty years and counting of litigation.87
Objectively, Taylor was denied one-third of his sentencing options. In
reality, given his concern over the impact of the taped confession, Taylor was
denied one-half of his sentencing options, leaving him only one choice if he

78. Id. at 644.
79. Id.
80. Brief of Respondent Troy Steele, supra note 65, at 7.
81. State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209, 214–15 (Mo.1996).
82. See State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 641–45 (citing extensively from Taylor’s original
plea hearing transcript).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 655–57 (Stith, J., dissenting) (both of Taylor’s attorneys testified to Taylor’s
ignorance).
85. Id. at 657. Whether or not the state would have granted permission, as required by the
statute, is moot at this juncture. The failure to inform alone warrants consideration under Padilla
and Webb’s ineffective assistance analysis. Moreover, the failure severely undermines the validity
of Taylor’s alleged waiver.
86. Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 2003)
87. Counting from his initial plea in 1991 through the 2011 Missouri Supreme Court opinion
and the federal habeas claim that is currently in process. Telephone Interview with Robert W.
Lundt, Attorney, Mo. Public Defender’s Office (Nov. 11, 2011) (confirming that the Federal
Public Defender’s Office was preparing an appeal).
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wanted to plead guilty to avoid appearing to contest his guilt. Intuitively, it
simply seems wrong to deny an individual facing a possible death sentence full
disclosure of their sentencing options. The following section calls for a
reexamination of Taylor’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in light of
Padilla and Webb.
B.

The Case of Michael Anthony Taylor: Taylor’s Strickland Claim PrePadilla

In 2003, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Taylor’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.88 Despite acknowledging serious concerns, the
court found Taylor’s claim was procedurally barred.89 The court stated the
following concerns: a “clearly wrong” ruling by a state PCR judge who refused
to allow Taylor to assert his ineffective assistance claim;90 contradictory and
disingenuous arguments from the state;91 the State’s reneging on an apparent
agreement to waive future procedural objections;92 and the subsequent failure
of Taylor’s counsel to appeal the claim further in state court.93 The court
indicated these concerns may be sufficient to show cause for—and prejudice
from—the procedural failure sufficient to excuse Taylor’s procedural default.94
However, at that time, Taylor had not met the requirements of the exhaustion
doctrine which requires “that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel be
initially ‘presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be
used to establish cause for a procedural default’” in a federal habeas
88. Bowersox, 329 F.3d at 969.
89. Id. at 971.
90. Id. at 970. The first PCR judge found Taylor’s plea counsel was not ineffective, but this
judgment was vacated by a 1993 Missouri Supreme Court order. Id. (citing Taylor v. Missouri,
Nos. CV91-20562, CV91-20638, 64 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 1, 1992). After Taylor was again
sentenced to death by a judge, Taylor reiterated his ineffective assistance claim in a second PCR
motion. Id. The judge, relying in error on the first PCR judge’s vacated ruling, declined to
consider the claim. Id. (citing Taylor v. Missouri, No. Civ. 94-19962 (Mo. Cir. Ct. June 19,
1995).
91. Id. In the second PCR hearing the state argued Taylor’s ineffective assistance claim had
been rejected by the 1993 Missouri Supreme Court order even though the order made no mention
of the claim. Id. Now, “the state argues, for the first time in federal court, that [the second PCR
judge] was wrong and that Taylor . . . had a duty to appeal this erroneous ruling to the Missouri
Supreme Court. At best, the state’s arguments appear to be disingenuous.” Id.
92. Id. In the second penalty proceeding where, after asking the judge to take judicial notice
of and preserve all previous issues for appeal, Taylor’s counsel asked the state “if it ‘would not
object procedurally in the [state] or the federal courts to all [that the judge] took judicial notice
of.’” Id. The court then quotes from the transcript, which indicates that the state appeared to
agree. Id. The state now argues it did not waive future procedural objections and the court,
indicating its disapproval of the state’s conduct, was forced to conclude the state’s stipulation was
not specific enough to support Taylor’s claim. Id.
93. Bowersox, 329 F.3d at 969–71.
94. Id. at 971.
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proceeding.95 This Article proceeds to the substance of Taylor’s ineffective
assistance claim on the assumption that Taylor is capable of meeting these
procedural requirements, especially in state court.96
Taylor alleged his plea counsel constituted ineffective assistance for failing
to inform him of section 565.006.2, which would have allowed Taylor to plead
guilty and, with state permission, face a jury for sentencing.97 Although it held
the claim was procedurally barred at the time, the Eighth Circuit unnecessarily
went on to reject Taylor’s ineffective assistance claim under Strickland.98
Recognizing Taylor’s plea counsel failed to inform him of section 565.006.2,
the court nonetheless found “no evidence of constitutionally defective
lawyering.”99 Instead, it agreed with the vacated conclusions of Taylor’s first
PCR judge that, despite being fired by the public defender’s office in the midst
of her representation and being subsequently appointed by the court to
continue representing Taylor, Leslie Delk “performed well within the bounds
of professional competence.”100 The court also found Taylor suffered “no
prejudice [in] not being advised of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.006.2, because,” in the
court’s opinion, “there is no showing it would have affected his decision to
plead guilty.”101 The court reasoned, in light of Taylor’s plea testimony, that he
wanted to avoid a jury and there was no credible showing that knowing of
section 565.006.2 “would have affected his decision to be sentenced by a
judge.”102 Additionally, the court emphasized that section 565.006.2 did not
grant a substantive right but required state permission, which was unlikely in
this case.103 Having found “no evidence of constitutionally deficient

95. Id. (citing Murry v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
96. See Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant
Habeas Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 431–33 (2004) (citing State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102
S.W.3d 541, 546–48 (Mo. 2003) (recognizing Missouri Courts’ authority to grant habeas relief
more broadly than federal courts)).
97. Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963, 972 (8th Cir. 2003). Taylor alleged ineffective
assistance on several grounds, but the focus of this Article is Taylor’s plea counsels’ failure to
inform him of his third sentencing option contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.006.2 (1986). Id.
98. Id. at 973; Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012) (internal citations omitted) (“It
is well settled that the right to the effective assistance of counsel applies to certain steps before
trial. The ‘Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all
‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.’ Critical stages include arraignments, postindictment
interrogations, postindictment lineups, and the entry of a guilty plea.”).
99. Bowersox, 329 F.3d at 973.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. In light of Ring, this characterization of section 565.006.2 is erroneous. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees both the right to jury trial on guilt and to jury fact-finding on all of the
elements necessary to impose a sentence. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
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lawyering,” the court concluded, “there can be no prejudice in upholding the
procedural default of Taylor’s ineffective assistance of plea counsel claim.”104
C. The Case of Michael Anthony Taylor: Applying Padilla to Capital
Sentencing Consequences
The reviewing court on Taylor’s next appeal should extend Padilla’s
holding to include, at least, failing to inform or misinforming a defendant of
sentencing consequences in capital cases, and remand Taylor’s ineffective
assistance claim in light of Padilla and Webb.105
The Webb concurrence, far from alone in this line of thinking,106
convincingly argues that a faithful reading of Padilla requires its holding to be
applied to sentencing consequences generally.107 The case for applying Padilla
in the capital sentencing context is even more persuasive. First, death is the
original “different.”108 By its recognition that Padilla represented a unique
“class of adjudications” that require heightened procedural protections, the
Court in Padilla “endorsed the argument that ‘deportation is different.’”109
This of course echoes the Court’s now famous declaration that “death . . . is
different.”110 The greater difference in both severity and finality that led the
Court to set death penalty cases apart “as a unique category of adjudications
that require a set of rules all their own” exceeds deportation consequences in
both respects.111 Second, while Padilla held the importance of the procedural
protection for deportation consequences trumped the government’s
“floodgates” arguments,112 the more severe and final consequences and small
number of defendants lessens the force of the “floodgates” argument even
further in the capital sentencing context. A total of 7,879 people were
sentenced to death between 1977 and 2010.113 Just 3,158 inmates were held

104. Bowersox, 329 F.3d at 973.
105. Assuming, as mentioned above, Taylor can overcome the procedural bar. Bowersox, 329
F.3d at 971.
106. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.
107. Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Mo. 2011) (Wolff, J., concurring).
108. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–58 (1977).
109. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1299, 1300–01
(2011) (citing Brief of Petitioner at 54, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651),
2009 WL 1497552); see also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (“Deportation as a consequence of a
criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult
to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.”).
110. Markowitz, supra note 109, at 1300 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–58
(1977)).
111. Id.
112. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
113. TRACY L. SNELL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES, U.S. DEP’T. OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (Dec. 2011, NCJ 236510), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2236.
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under sentence of death in thirty-six states and the federal prison system at the
end of 2010.114 Only 104 inmates were received under the sentence of death in
2010, “representing the smallest number of admissions since 1973.”115 “This
represents the tenth consecutive year that the number of inmates under
sentence of death has decreased.”116 Taylor’s case presents a compelling
example of the need to apply Padilla to include sentencing consequences in
capital cases.
The facts surrounding Taylor’s plea are illustrative. Due to the heinous
nature of the crime and his videotaped confession, both of Taylor’s attorneys,
erroneously believing he could only face the same trier-of-fact at both phases,
counseled him to plead guilty because insisting on a guilt phase trial might
“inflame the fact-finder” for the punishment phase if Taylor was perceived as
trying to back out of his confession.117 This was, at best, misadvice based on
Taylor’s attorneys’ failure to become familiar with all three of Taylor’s
sentencing options.118 Mr. McLain, who left the public defender’s office for a
position in Florida prior to the plea, testified he was entirely unaware section
565.006.2 provided a third sentencing option.119 Taylor’s other counsel, Ms.
Delk, was terminated from her position as a Missouri Public Defender just
after the plea but prior to sentencing.120 She later testified that she was aware
of the statute but for some reason never discussed it with Taylor or Mr.
McLain.121 Ms. Delk further testified that by her omission she “failed in her
obligation to advise [Taylor] of all of his options.”122 Based on the incomplete
and incorrect advice of his attorneys, Taylor pleaded guilty.123 Because he was
unaware he could, and thus did not, request jury sentencing, judicial sentencing
was an essentially automatic consequence of his guilty plea. After a hearing,
Taylor was sentenced to death by a judge.124 Upon learning of section
565.006.2, Taylor immediately filed a PCR action alleging his plea was
involuntary and that he would not have made the same decision but for the
ineffectiveness of his plea counsel.125

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 672 (Mo. 2011) (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id.
State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d. at 657.
Id. at 637.
Id..
Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 2003).
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Once found guilty, the sentencing options in Missouri are life
imprisonment without parole or the death penalty.126 It is not an overstatement
to say that at this stage of a capital case the consequences of every decision are
life or death, particularly with regard to deciding whether one judge or twelve
unanimous jurors will impose that sentence. The United States Supreme Court
has held that the Sixth Amendment entitles capital defendants to a jury
determination of all of the facts on which eligibility for the death sentence is
predicated, including aggravating circumstances.127 Missouri has retroactively
applied that right in the case of defendants who chose jury sentencing but were
sentenced to death by a judge after the jury deadlocked.128 Because Taylor was
never informed of section 565.006.2, he was effectively and automatically
denied that right when he pleaded guilty. Taylor should have had the choice or,
at least, the chance to request permission to plead guilty to a judge and be
sentenced by a jury in accordance with his Sixth Amendment right.
At least equal to or exceeding the sentencing consequences discussed in
Webb,129 the consequences of Taylor’s uninformed guilty plea share similar
characteristics with deportation. For defendants like Padilla deportation was
“practically inevitable.”130 Because Taylor was never informed of section
565.006.2, it too was a practically inevitable consequence of Taylor’s plea that
he would be denied jury sentencing and have to face judicial sentencing.131
While it was deportation in Padilla, for Taylor’s class of defendants—those
facing death penalty sentencing—the choice between judge or jury sentencing
is one of, if not the most, important considerations in whether or not to plead
guilty.132 This is particularly true in a state like Missouri that allows each trierof-fact to elect mercy after the weighing process.133 Indeed, the unique nature
of deportation as a “particularly severe penalty” is perhaps only trumped by the
severity of being denied the right to jury sentencing in a capital case as a result

126. See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text.
127. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 256–58 (Mo. 2003) (applying Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), retroactively in Missouri).
128. Id. at 268–69. Taylor claims he is similarly situated to the class of defendants in
Whitfield and is entitled to retroactive application of Ring as well. State ex rel. Taylor, 341
S.W.3d at 653 (Stith, J., dissenting). The Missouri Supreme Court recently rejected that claim
based on Taylor’s alleged waiver of jury sentencing. Id. at 652. The dissent makes a more
persuasive case that Taylor did not waive a right to jury sentencing he never knew he had and is
entitled to relief under Whitfield. Id. at 653–73 (Stith, J., dissenting).
129. Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 136 (Mo. 2011) (Wolff, J., concurring).
130. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
131. State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 654 (Stith, J., dissenting) (“The guilty plea transcript
shows merely that he knew that by pleading guilty he would not be afforded a jury trial on
punishment, not that he affirmatively wanted to avoid a jury trial on punishment or knew that he
could have requested a jury trial on punishment.”).
132. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
133. See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text.
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of a guilty plea.134 Like deportation in Padilla and parole eligibility in Webb,
the severe consequence for Taylor (denial of his right to jury sentencing with
his life on the line) was “intimately related” to and “most difficult to divorce
the penalty from the [plea] in [this] context.”135 Because the consequences of
Taylor’s uninformed plea—denial of the right to jury sentencing in a capital
case—equal or exceed the characteristics of deportation consequences in
Padilla, advice regarding both should “not [be] categorically removed from the
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”136 Following Padilla,
Strickland should apply to Taylor’s claim.137
D. The Case of Michael Anthony Taylor: Reexamining Taylor’s Strickland
Claim Post-Padilla
“Under Strickland, we first determine whether counsel’s representation
‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’”138 “Then we ask whether
‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”139 The Court in
Padilla emphasized that “[t]he first prong—constitutional deficiency—is
necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community:
‘The proper measure [being] simple reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.’”140
As Webb makes clear, misinforming or failing to inform a client of the
sentencing consequences of a plea violates practice expectations as outlined by
prevailing professional norms.141 For example, NLADA’s Compendium of
Standards for Indigent Defense Systems requires that “prior to the entry of the
plea, counsel should . . . make certain that the client fully and completely
understands . . . the consequences the accused will be exposed to by entering a
plea.”142 While no violation of professional norms should be taken lightly, the
failure to advise a client of one-third of his or her sentencing options in a
capital case is undoubtedly a more grievous violation than misadvice regarding
either parole eligibility or deportation. This is particularly true when, as a
result of the omission, the defendant loses an important constitutional
procedural protection like the right to jury sentencing as a consequence of the
misadvised plea. Simple reasonableness allows no other conclusion. Finally,
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
Id.
Id. at 1482.
Id.
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
Id. at 1482–83; Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 137 (Mo. 2011) (Wolff, J., concurring).
Webb, 334 S.W.3d at 137 (Wolff, J., concurring) (citing NLADA, COMPENDIUM OF
STANDARDS, supra note 61).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

270

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:253

just as in Padilla, here “the terms of the relevant [sentencing] statute are
succinct, clear, and explicit” and Taylor’s “counsel could easily have
determined [his plea options and the presumptively mandatory consequences]
simply from reading the text of the statute.”143 Section 565.006.2 squarely
addresses the precise situation Taylor’s attorneys’ were contemplating: when a
homicide defendant is permitted to waive a jury trial.144 The sentencing
consequences were truly clear and following Padilla, Taylor’s counsel had an
equally clear duty to correctly inform and advise their client.145 Thus, Taylor’s
claim should, like Padilla’s, be deemed to have “sufficiently alleged
constitutional deficiency to satisfy the first prong of Strickland.”146 While it is
admirable that Ms. Delk continued representing Taylor after her termination,
was “very professional,” and “displayed commendable loyalty to Taylor’s
interests,” nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit erred in its conclusion that such
“professional loyalty” amounts to “no evidence of constitutionally defective
lawyering.”147
Although the Court remanded Padilla’s Strickland prejudice inquiry, this
Article will briefly address whether Taylor suffered prejudice sufficient to
satisfy Strickland’s second prong in order to show the viability of Taylor’s
claim. Two recent Supreme Court cases have strengthened Taylor’s prejudice
claim. Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper were both handed down March
21, 2012, and address Strickland prejudice claims in the plea context.148 The
Court recognized “that plea bargains have become so central to the
administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have
responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to
render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in
the criminal process at critical stages.”149 The Court also indicated that the
prejudice determination in the plea context is fact-sensitive and needs to be
resolved on a case-by-case basis.150 These cases, taken together with Padilla,
143. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
144. “No defendant who pleads guilty to a homicide offense or who is found guilty of a
homicide offense after trial to the court without a jury shall be permitted a trial by jury on the
issue of the punishment to be imposed, except by agreement of the state.” MO. REV. STAT. §
565.006.2 (1986)
145. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
146. Id.
147. Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963, 973 (8th Cir. 2003).
148. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1376
(2012).
149. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
150. Both cases make extensive use of distinguishing language (italicized below) that
indicates a case by case approach:
This application of Strickland to the instances of an uncommunicated, lapsed plea
does nothing to alter the standard laid out in Hill [v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)]. In
cases where a defendant complains that ineffective assistance led him to accept a plea
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indicate the Court’s movement towards serious enforcement of Sixth
Amendment protections in the plea process and the necessity of analyzing the
Strickland prejudice prong on a case-by-case basis.
Traditionally, courts inquire “whether ‘there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’”151 In death penalty cases, that inquiry would normally
require a reasonable probability that the outcome of the sentence would be
different (i.e., life without parole rather than death) but for counsel’s errors.152
The Eighth Circuit did not focus on the ultimate sentence, but rather concluded
Taylor suffered no prejudice because the record indicated Taylor wanted to
plead guilty and there was “no showing” that knowledge of section 565.006.2
“would have affected his decision to [plead guilty and] be sentenced by a
judge.”153 However, Taylor’s motivation to plead guilty centered on the desire
to avoid the appearance of contesting his guilt, given his taped confession, and
thereby inflaming the same trier-of-fact which would sentence him.154 Not
wanting to be sentenced by a jury who believes you are trying to contest a selfconfessed kidnap, rape, and murder of a young girl does not equal wanting to
be sentenced by a judge. Thus, the proper question was not whether knowledge

offer as opposed to proceeding to trial, the defendant will have to show “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.” Hill was correctly decided and applies in the context in
which it arose. Hill does not, however, provide the sole means for demonstrating
prejudice arising from the deficient performance of counsel during plea negotiations.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409–10 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
In Frye, defense counsel did not inform the defendant of the plea offer; and after the
offer lapsed the defendant still pleaded guilty, but on more severe terms. Here, the
favorable plea offer was reported to the client but, on advice of counsel, was rejected. In
Frye there was a later guilty plea. Here, after the plea offer had been rejected, there was a
full and fair trial before a jury.
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
In contrast to Hill, here the ineffective advice led not to an offer’s acceptance but to
its rejection. Having to stand trial, not choosing to waive it, is the prejudice alleged. In
these circumstances a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel
there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court
(i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have
withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its
terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have
been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385 (emphasis added).
151. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
152. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699–700.
153. Bowersox, 329 F.3d at 973.
154. State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 671–73 (Mo. 2011) (Stith, J., dissenting)
(citing Taylor’s PCR testimony: Q. “Why did you decide to plead in front of a Judge? Why did
you decide to plead in front of Judge Meyers?” A. “Because of my videotaped statement.”).
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of section 565.006.2 would have caused Taylor to change his guilty plea, but
rather, whether knowledge of that section would have caused Taylor to request
jury sentencing following his guilty plea. Given Taylor and his counsels’
concerns, it appears reasonably probable that, had Taylor known, he would
have pleaded guilty and requested jury sentencing.155 It is reasonably probable
because, in Missouri, the requirement of a unanimous verdict and ability for
jurors to exercise mercy even if the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh
the aggravating circumstances would have given Taylor twelve chances to
receive mercy rather than one chance before a judge.156 This error alone
warrants a reexamination of the Eighth Circuit’s holding. Similar
considerations would apply if a reviewing court, based on Strickland’s
application in capital cases, considered whether being sentenced by twelve
jurors rather than one judge would have resulted in the “reasonable
probability” Taylor would be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than to
death under Missouri’s capital sentencing scheme.157 Is it reasonably probable
that, under a statute that allows a trier-of-fact the freedom to show mercy, a
different sentence would result if Taylor had twelve chances to receive that
mercy rather than one?
Beyond the two issues addressed in the preceding paragraph, the failure of
Taylor’s attorneys to inform him of section 565.006.2 caused Taylor to suffer
prejudice in at least one additional respect. Taylor’s ignorance of the option
left him believing he was unable to request jury sentencing.158 His resulting
failure to even request jury sentencing prejudiced Taylor’s equal protection
claim in his most recent Missouri Supreme Court case.159 In that case, the court
considered whether its retroactive application of the Sixth Amendment right
for a jury to find all the facts necessary for the imposition of the death penalty
included Taylor’s situation: where a defendant pleaded guilty and faced
judicial sentencing based on incorrect and incomplete knowledge of the
sentencing scheme.160 In State v. Whitfield the court retroactively applied this
Sixth Amendment right to defendants seeking collateral review where the
defendant requested jury sentencing but “the jury was unable to reach a verdict
[i.e., deadlocked] and the judge made the required factual determinations and
imposed the death penalty.”161 The court in that case recalled its mandate

155. Id. at 665–66.
156. See supra notes 65–74 and accompanying text.
157. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699–700.
158. State ex rel Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 654.
159. Id. at 652.
160. Id. at 634, 649 n.18.
161. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268–69 (Mo. 2003) (applying Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002). Ring held the following: “Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants
. . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase
in their maximum punishment [e.g., aggravating circumstances].” Ring, 536 U.S. at 589.
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affirming Whitfield’s conviction and death sentence, resentencing him to “life
imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act
of the Governor.”162 Taylor contended he was similarly situated to the class of
defendants identified in Whitfield, but the court both refused to include him
within its existing retroactive application and refused to expand its reading.163
The court reasoned Taylor’s original plea and waiver—although given without
full knowledge of the sentencing scheme and before the Sixth Amendment
right was recognized by the United States Supreme Court164—effectively
differentiated Taylor from those defendants to whom the court had granted
retroactive application.165 However, had Taylor’s counsel informed him of
section 565.006.2 and had Taylor requested but been denied jury sentencing, it
is reasonably probable he would be considered similarly situated to the jurydeadlock defendants covered by Whitfield.166 It is therefore reasonably

It should be noted that Ring and its progeny did not address whether the Sixth
Amendment right to jury fact-finding all the facts necessary for sentencing applied retroactively
to those on death row awaiting capital punishment. Daren S. Koudele, Comment, Unraveling
Ring v. Arizona: Balancing Judicial Sentencing Enhancements with the Sixth Amendment in
Capital Punishment Schemes, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 843, 874–75 (2004). This resulted in varying
interpretations of Ring’s retroactive application in the wake of that decision. See id. at 875 (citing
a split between the 11th and 9th Circuits as an example). The Supreme Court addressed the issue
in Schriro v. Summerlin using the Teague retroactivity test and concluded that, for federal courts,
“Ring announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on
direct review.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 311–13 (1989)).
However, the states are “free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice
system[s] than the Federal Constitution requires.” Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 267 (quoting
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983)). Consequently, Teague is not controlling, and
the States may provide retroactive application of a new constitutional rule in a broader range of
cases than in the federal system. Id. (noting Teague sets the minimum constitutional protections
all states must follow). Following Ring, but prior to Schriro, in State v. Whitfield the Missouri
Supreme Court chose to continue applying the Linkletter-Stovall test Missouri traditionally
utilized rather than adopt the Supreme Court’s Teague test for determining retroactivity and, as a
result, “decided to offer greater retroactive application” of Ring. Id. at 266, 268 (citing Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)).
162. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 256.
163. State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 649–52 (Mo. 2011).
164. See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 623–24 (2005) (holding Halbert could not waive
his unrecognized constitutional right to appellate counsel even though that was the automatic
consequence of his guilty plea under Michigan law).
165. See State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 641–45 (citing from Taylor’s plea and PCR
testimony as evidence of a valid waiver).
166. The majority opinion is correct that the State likely would have denied Taylor’s request
for jury sentencing under section 565.006.2. State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 645–46.
However, it is precisely that request and denial that would make Taylor similarly situated to the
defendants in Whitfield and its progeny who requested but were denied jury sentencing due to
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probable Taylor would have been entitled to retroactive application of the
Sixth Amendment right for a jury to find all facts necessary to impose the
death sentence, but for his counsels’ failure to inform him of section
565.006.2. Thus, following Missouri precedent, Taylor would either face
resentencing or receive an automatic life sentence without parole.167 The
Supreme Court’s decisions in Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper show that
the prejudice inquiry must be conducted on a case-by-case basis; looking at the
facts in Taylor’s case in light of those cases, either outcome demonstrates that
Taylor was prejudiced by his counsels’ failure to affirmatively advise him of
section 565.006.2.
The preceding sections have shown that Padilla’s holding can and should
be applied beyond deportation consequences.168 The Webb concurrence
presented a persuasive proposal for applying Padilla in Missouri to include
sentencing consequences generally.169 The strength of that proposal, especially
in capital sentencing cases, has been illustrated by the case of Michael
Anthony Taylor, whose ineffective assistance claim should be reversed in light
of Padilla and Webb. The following section acknowledges the potentially
insurmountable burden such an application would place on the public defender
system and proposes a set of reforms, which, if taken together, would enable
the criminal justice system to effectively mitigate this added burden.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH APPLYING PADILLA AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Any serious discussion of Padilla must pause to consider how its holding
can realistically be implemented in the current criminal justice system.
Whether one views Padilla as a reaffirmation or an expansion of the duties of
defense attorneys, even the lone duty to comprehend all potential immigration
consequences and provide affirmative advice pertinent to each client’s
situation is a substantial burden to bear.170 To simply say “competent counsel
must do more” ignores the nationwide reality of excessive public defender
workloads.171 Certainly then, any proposed application of Padilla beyond
immigration consequences must appreciate and make provision for the
additional burden such application will place upon defense attorneys.
Recognizing that reality and building upon existing proposals, this Article

jury deadlock. See Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioner Michael A. Taylor, State ex rel. Taylor
v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634 (Mo. 2011).
167. State ex rel. Taylor, 341 S.W.3d at 654 (Stith, J., dissenting); Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at
256.
168. See supra notes 138–50 and accompany text.
169. Id.
170. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 1483–84 (2010).
171. See Laurence A. Benner, Eliminating Excessive Public Defender Workloads, CRIM.
JUST., Summer 2011, at 24, 25.
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contends Missouri should pursue unified reforms under a consumer protection
regulation framework, including adopting an affirmative duty on the trial court
to modify its existing plea colloquy and on sentencing commissions to provide
pre-sentencing reports to defendants like Taylor. Absent these measures, given
the public defender “crisis” in the state, it is unlikely defendants in Missouri
courts will receive the constitutionally effective assistance of counsel required
by the Sixth Amendment in light of Padilla.
Nationwide the majority of public defender offices have attorney caseloads
that exceed nationally recognized minimum caseload standards endorsed by
the American Bar Association as necessary to protect the Sixth Amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel.172 It is beyond the scope of this
Article to provide an in-depth study of the state of the Missouri Public
Defender System (“MSPD”). Fortunately, others better suited to the task have
done so, conducting extensive research and analysis into the MSPD.173 These
scholars have concluded that the MSPD is confronting “a situation as urgent as
it is dire.”174 The “MSPD is confronting an overwhelming caseload crisis, one
of the worst of its kind in the nation—a crisis so serious that it has pushed the
entire criminal justice system in Missouri to the brink of collapse.”175 High
turnover resulted in a near one hundred percent cumulative turnover rate
between 2001 and 2005.176 As of 2008, Missouri ranked “dead last in the
amount of per capita funding for its public defenders.”177 “A study
commissioned by the Missouri Bar concluded that the public defender system
has deteriorated to the point where it often provides ‘nothing more than the
illusion of a lawyer.’”178
Padilla does not address this reality. When read alone, Padilla places the
duty to provide affirmative advice squarely on the shoulders of defense
attorneys.179 However, Padilla alone, much less the application of Padilla
proposed in this Article, may just be the straw that breaks the camel’s back for
172. Id. at 25 (citing AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM (Feb. 2002),
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf.).
173. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP & THE CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LAW & SOC’Y, ASSESSMENT
OF THE MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM 64 (Oct. 2009), http://members.mobar.org/
pdfs/public-defender/2009-report.pdf [hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF THE MSPD SYSTEM]; and
Sean D. O’Brien, Missouri’s Public Defender Crisis: Shouldering the Burden Alone, 75 MO. L.
REV. 853 (2010).
174. O’Brien, supra note 173, at 865 (citing ASSESSMENT OF THE MSPD SYSTEM, supra note
173, at 66).
175. O’Brien, supra note 173, at 865.
176. Id. at 866 (citing ASSESSMENT OF THE MSPD SYSTEM supra note 173, at 66).
177. Id. at 865 (citing Laura Denvir Stith, Chief Justice Laura Denvir Stith Addresses the
Missouri Bar, Judicial Conference, 64 J. MO. B. 280, 282 (2008)).
178. Id. (citing ASSESSMENT OF THE MSPD SYSTEM, supra note 173, at 66).
179. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 1483–84 (2010).
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the MSPD and other public defender systems. In order to protect the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants, absent substantial changes in the
public defender system in Missouri, the burden imposed by Padilla must be
shared by the state’s trial courts and sentencing commission.
A.

Rethinking the Role of the Trial Court
1.

Judicial Warnings

Vivian Chang correctly asserts that the “altered legal duty of defense
counsel post-Padilla necessarily calls for a re-examination of the legal duty of
trial courts as well.”180 Because of the “vast deference afforded to defense
counsel” under the Strickland standard, Chang argues “mere policing of
defense counsel’s duty” is insufficient and consequently “court instruction on
[plea] consequences . . . is thus necessary in order to: (1) secure well-informed
pleas . . . and (2) conserve the limited resources of the criminal justice
system.”181 Chang thus proposes a judicial warning based on “model language
for new criminal rules of procedure that would impose a [heightened] duty
upon courts to inform all criminal defendants . . . at plea colloquy.”182
“Although Padilla does not mandate that trial courts re-assess the language of
their [duties, including] plea colloquy warnings,” Chang rightly believes the
“changed duty on the part of defense counsel will realistically lead to a
changed duty on the part of trial courts.”183
Focusing solely on immigration consequences, Chang’s proposed reform
was drafted “so as to allow compatibility with any system” and results in a
simple, two-sentence instruction to the court to: (1) directly advise the
defendant of the immigration consequences of his or her guilty plea; (2) ensure
the defendant understands those consequences; and (3) allow the court to
provide a “reasonable amount of time to consider the appropriateness of the
plea in light of the advisement.”184 Recognizing that “[j]udicial warnings
cannot substitute for the effective assistance of counsel,” Chang nonetheless
concludes such warnings are an ideal vehicle for bolstering the reliability of a
defendant’s plea.185 Chang draws support for her position from the concurrence
of Justice Alito (himself a former prosecutor) in Padilla who, in turn, notes
that many states already require some form of judicial warning regarding
immigration consequences during plea colloquy.186 Although limited to
180. Vivian Chang, Note, Where Do We Go From Here: Plea Colloquy Warnings and
Immigration Consequences Post-Padilla, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 189, 191 (2011).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 208.
185. Chang, supra note 180, at 209.
186. Id. (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring)).
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immigration consequences, Chang’s proposal correctly recognizes that defense
counsel alone are incapable of safeguarding their clients’ Sixth Amendment
rights. Her proposal of enhanced judicial warnings could easily be expanded to
include sentencing consequences. Imposing such a corresponding and
concurrent duty upon the court receiving a defendant’s plea in Missouri would
be a positive step towards realistic protection of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.
2.

Warding Off Complacency

Similarly emphasizing the role and duty of the plea judge, United States
District Court Judge Robert Pratt has recently written that Padilla “serves as a
reminder that the plea process and its implications should never be dismissed
as routine, regardless of how commonplace it may be in American
jurisprudence.”187 For Pratt, the “primary implication of Padilla in [his] work
as a judge is in the plea process, since Padilla is, for all practical purposes, part
and parcel of the Strickland standard.”188 Thus, Pratt emphasizes that “[t]rial
judges must, as they always have, ensure that a defendant’s plea is knowing,
voluntary, and made only after full disclosure ha[s] been made concerning the
consequences of the plea.”189 Noting how essential vast numbers of guilty
pleas are to the criminal justice system, Pratt stresses that “courts and litigants
must always be mindful of the serious consequences that result since
“[d]efendants give up important constitutional rights when they opt to plead
guilty.”190 Pratt exhorts his fellow judges that “[w]hile guilty pleas are the most
common means to a conviction in our legal system, we must never forget that
the effect of a guilty plea is precisely the same as [a jury verdict].”191 “For this
reason,” Pratt continues, “every guilty plea hearing must be conducted with no
less respect or dignity than that accorded a jury trial, regardless of how many
dozens or even hundreds of pleas the presiding judge has taken.”192
The duty of the trial judge in the plea process is paramount. “Ultimately,”
Pratt emphasizes, “the primary duty of a judge in a plea proceeding is to
exercise his or her ‘sound discretion,’ in determining whether to accept or
reject the guilty plea.”193 In the federal system a plea must meet the
requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, requiring a plea to be
187. Robert Pratt, J., The Implications Of Padilla v. Kentucky On Practice In United States
District Courts, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV 169, 190 (2011).
188. Id. at 179.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 171.
191. Id. at 172.
192. Pratt, supra note 187, at 172.
193. “Rule 11 gives the court discretion to accept or reject a plea agreement.” Id. at 173, n.18
(citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A), which states the following: “[T]he court may accept the
agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.”)
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knowing, voluntary, and intelligent in order to be accepted.194 The
requirements in Missouri for waiver of federal constitutional rights are
equivalent.195 In addition to these legal requirements, Pratt advises judges to be
mindful of the “human element of pleas.”196 The frequency of guilty pleas will
often mean a judge is familiar with the attorneys on both sides and will “likely
enter the hearing with a presumption that the plea should be accepted.”197 Pratt
cautions judges to a heightened level of “humility, seriousness, and clarity in
the plea proceeding” since a judge “typically knows nothing, or very little,
about the defendant” whose plea they must evaluate.198
Of even greater consequence post-Padilla is the court’s inquiry “of both
the defendant and the defendant’s counsel to determine whether the proposed
plea is both ‘knowing’ and ‘voluntary,’ or if it is the product of coercion or
lack of advice from the lawyer.”199 In conducting the plea colloquy judges
“cannot ignore the fact that the vast majority of defendants will look at their
lawyers and say, ‘what should I do?’”200 To meet this standard post-Padilla
“the judge must do more than just repeat a questionnaire from rote memory
and listen for the ‘right’ answers.”201 Pratt’s emphasis on the “human element”
resurfaces here as he notes that “[t]he atmosphere of the proceeding and the
demeanor evidence that a judge observes must be taken into account” in
addition to “the advice the defendant does or does not receive from
counsel.”202
Pratt prefaces his conclusion with a further word of warning arising from
the frequency with which judges hear guilty pleas:
With so many guilty pleas taking place, it is far too easy for everyone involved
to start believing that ‘everyone is guilty’ and that establishing guilt on the
record is just a ‘formality.’ With such an attitude comes complacency and a
203
lack of attention to the details of the plea proceeding.

The article concludes with a powerful reminder that “due process is equally a
requirement of convictions by guilty plea.”204 Missouri judges who heed

194. Pratt, supra note 187, at 179 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1); Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242 (1969)).
195. “The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a proceeding is
governed by federal standards. “ Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243.
196. Pratt, supra note 187, at 175.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 176.
200. Id.
201. Pratt, supra note 187, at 177; see also supra notes 187, 192 and accompanying text.
202. Pratt, supra note 187, at 177–78.
203. Id. at 180.
204. Id. at 181.
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towards

protecting

Rethinking the Role of Sentencing Commissions
1.

Sentencing Commissions as Pre-Plea Information Providers

In his Webb concurrence, Judge Wolff announced to the Missouri criminal
justice system that “Padilla puts courts on notice that reciting the usual nothreats-no-promises litany at sentencing does not necessarily ensure that the
plea is voluntary.”205 Beginning in that opinion, Wolff noted the assistance preplea sentencing reports could provide to overburdened public defenders in
meeting their duties post-Padilla.206 Wolff builds upon that proposal in a
recent article, discussing the role state sentencing commissions can play in
providing such additional information post-Padilla.207 Contemplating Padilla’s
premise that constitutionally competent counsel should “know and disclose”
the consequences of a guilty plea, Wolff acknowledges that “[t]he practical
problem . . . is that hardly anyone knows the full range of consequences.”208
Wolff continues, “in most jurisdictions no judge, prosecutor, defense attorney,
legislator, or agency staffer could identify all of the statutes that would be
triggered by [a guilty plea and] conviction of the various offenses in the
criminal code.”209 Sentencing commissions are perhaps best positioned to fill
this gap.
Approximately twenty-one states have sentencing commissions.210 While
their role and responsibility varies from state to state, all such commissions
serve as a potential source of information in the plea context while most “set
forth recommended or prescribed punishments for felony offenses.”211 In
Missouri, “the commission recommends but does not prescribe
punishments.”212 In this advisory capacity, the commission provides
information to the sentencing judge who has the ultimate authority “to fashion

205. Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Mo. 2011) (Wolff, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 140.
207. Michael A. Wolff, Incorporating Collateral Consequences Into Sentencing Guidelines
And Recommendations Post-Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 183 (2011).
208. Id. at 188.
209. Id. (citing UNIFY. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 4 CMT).
210. Id. at 186 (citing NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM (2008), http://www.ncsc
online.org/csi/PEW-Profiles-v12-online.pdf).
211. Id. at 186–87.
212. Wolff, supra note 207, at 187. Judge Wolff is well-acquainted with sentencing
commissions in general, and Missouri’s in particular, having served as chair of Missouri’s
sentencing advisory commission for seven years. Id.
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a punishment within the statutory limits prescribed by law.”213 There seems to
be no impediment to providing such information prior to the plea hearing, but,
despite the important role state sentencing commissions could play, as of the
publication of Wolff’s article, none “had taken any steps to accommodate the
principles set forth in Padilla v. Kentucky.”214
Ideally, Wolff notes, “it may be useful to consider what a reasonable
defendant would want to know prior to pleading guilty and what information,
if not disclosed until after the plea, would cause a reasonable defendant to want
to withdraw the plea.”215 Perhaps in recognition that sentencing commissions
are similarly over-burdened, Wolff backs away from such an individualized
approach and instead endorses online publication and ready access to “lists of
the consequences of a state’s twenty-five most frequently charged offenses.”216
Wolff rightly concludes that even such a minimally enhanced role for state
sentencing commissions “not only avoids post-conviction proceedings in
which the offender claims that his attorney did not provide competent
representation, but as importantly helps [sentencing] commissions to meet their
goals of fairness and transparency.”217
2.

The Case for Individualized Pre-Plea Reports

Taking inspiration from “Padilla’s recognition that the current [plea]
system offer[s] inadequate information,” Professor Gabriel Chin envisions a
role for sentencing commissions similar to Wolff, but endorses utilizing
individualized pre-sentence reports (PSRs) to fill the information-gap.218 To
accomplish this purpose, Chin recognizes the need for PSRs to be prepared
before a guilty plea.219 Having PSRs in hand prior to a plea hearing would
benefit both the prosecution and defense since both would better understand
the options and the actual sentencing range, and would thus be better equipped
to “produce plea bargains which are more knowing and informed.”220 Indeed,
Chin contends that “[t]he actual PSR . . . should be the basis of a plea.”221 The
absence of a pre-plea PSR “means that the most portentous decision in the
criminal case—to accept a guilty plea . . . or to go to trial—is made without the
benefit of some of the most important facts” since a plea typically binds a
defendant to the findings of the sentencing court which are in turn based
213. Id.
214. Id. (confirming via email correspondence, periodic literature, and internet searches).
215. Id. at 190.
216. Id. at 191 (citing Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and
Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 686–87 (2011)).
217. Wolff, supra note 207, at 192.
218. Chin, supra note 13, at 61.
219. Id. at 62.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 70.
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largely upon the contents of the PSR.222 Chin notes that the lack of pre-plea
PSRs is the result of “custom and choice,” not inability.223 While providing
pre-plea PSRs may delay the plea hearing, the practice would inevitably
shorten the time between the plea and sentencing, resulting in no significant
overall delay in the process.224 Any costs incurred in instituting pre-plea PSRs
would be minimal compared to the benefits of increased understanding and
improving “the fairness and legitimacy of the criminal justice system.”225 Chin
notes that this is especially true under our current system where defendants
face severe sentencing consequences:
In Boykin v. Alabama, the Supreme Court explained further: “What is at
stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost
solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and
226
of its consequence.”

Incorporating Chin’s pre-plea PSR proposal, especially where the PSR forms
the basis of the plea, would represent another safeguard for criminal
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.
C. Towards a Consumer Regulation Model
Professor Stephanos Bibas’s proposal offers a model that effectively
incorporates the preceding proposals into a unified reform framework to
mitigate the burden imposed by Padilla.227 “To complete Padilla’s unfinished
business,” Professor Bibas suggests, “the Court and legislatures should look to
consumer protection law to regulate at least the process if not the substance of
plea[s].”228 Given that in our current system the vast majority of adjudicated
cases are resolved by guilty pleas rather than trials,229 Bibas commends Padilla
222. Id. at 63.
223. Chin, supra note 13, at 67.
224. Id. at 71.
225. Id. at 74. Chin cites from a D.C. Circuit opinion noting the greater confidence a pre-plea
PSR would have provided that court. Id. at 66 (citing U.S. v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 839 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (Buckley, J., concurring)). Chin adds that one of the judges lamented that “[the
defendant’s] decision to forego the exercise of a constitutional right was not as informed as it
could have been, hence not as voluntary as it might have been. “ Id. at 68–69 (citing Home, 987
F.2d at 840 (Buckley, J., concurring)).
226. Chin, supra note 13, at 74.
227. See Bibas, supra note 13.
228. Id. at 1117.
229. Id. at 1118–19 n.2 (“In 2004, of 582,480 felony convictions in state courts, 95 percent
resulted from guilty pleas. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics Online, tbl.5.46.2004,http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t5462004.pdf. In fiscal year 2009, of 86,798 criminal cases disposed of in federal district court by
trial or plea (thus excluding dismissals), 96.4 percent were disposed of by pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere. Id. at tbl.5.24.2009, http:// www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242009.pdf. Though it
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as the “first case to treat plea-bargaining as a subject worthy of constitutional
regulation in its own right and on its own terms.”230
“It is astonishing,” Bibas opines, “that a $100 credit-card purchase of a
microwave oven is regulated more carefully than a guilty plea that results in
years of imprisonment [or death].”231 Bibas proposes extending to the plea
process the U.S. model of consumer protection regulation, which is “designed
to ensure that consumers understand and consider carefully the most important
terms of their bargains.”232 At a minimum, Bibas argues that regulation of “the
contracting process procedurally to ensure a modicum of understanding” is
necessary in the plea context.233 Bibas identifies various systemic problems
within the plea system and proposes corresponding reforms drawn from
consumer regulation, stressing that the “most basic and important reforms
[should] focus on ensuring that defendants know what they are doing.”234
Improved comprehension is critical because most defendants are
“unsophisticated laymen facing repeat-player prosecutors” who may feel
pressured to make hurried decisions by defense attorneys who are “often
overburdened, of varying ability and experience, and [who] may have
incentives to plead cases out quickly.”235
In response to these systemic deficiencies, Bibas begins with the proposal
that “all plea agreements should be in writing.”236 He further argues that all
information contained in plea documents should be displayed as in consumer
contracts, following standard best practices and psychological research,
resulting in the following benefits: common-sense terminology, less required
mathematical calculations and inferences, more visual displays, standard
numerical formats, and phrasing risks in absolute terms.237 “Clear numbers,”
he argues, “should be accompanied by clear language.”238 To accomplish this
task, Bibas envisions a role for the American Law Institute or Uniform Law
Commission in drafting such “plain English” summaries of common portions
of plea documents.239 To counter the pressure to make a hasty plea, Bibas
advocates generally “forbid[ding] guilty pleas at the initial appearance for

is impossible to be sure, most of these pleas probably resulted from plea bargains. “); see supra
note 5 and accompanying text.
230. Bibas, supra note 13, at 1120.
231. Id. at 1153.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1154.
235. Bibas, supra note 13, at 1153.
236. Id. at 1154.
237. Id. (“For example, . . . phras[ing] sentencing ranges not as 126 to 144 months but as 10
to 12 years.” Id.)
238. Id. at 1155.
239. Id.
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serious felonies” and imposing a “cooling-off period for plea bargains
authorizing five years’ imprisonment or more.”240 Under Bibas’ proposal,
prosecutors would have to disclose the terms of the plea in writing and defense
attorneys would have to provide advice regarding the plea a certain number of
days prior to the plea hearing.241 Bibas stresses that “cooling-off periods” are
“most valuable when (1) people make a decision infrequently and are therefore
inexperienced, and (2) the decision is an emotional one.”242 Pleas made by a
defendant facing serious felony charges meet both criteria.243
The imposition of a “cooling-off period” where a defendant would have an
opportunity to reflect, ask questions, and receive advice about a clear and
comprehensible plea summary is, perhaps, Bibas’ most persuasive proposal.
However, even Bibas recognizes that to make his proposals effective, defense
attorneys would require “training, guidance, and reminders” from outside
sources such as bar associations, computer programs, and the like.244 If
followed, Bibas’ reforms taken in conjunction with an enhanced role for
sentencing commissions and trial courts would go a long way towards
improving defendants’ comprehension of their pleas and corresponding
protection of their constitutional rights.
D. A Unified Vision of Reform
The proposals outlined above could easily, and perhaps necessarily should,
be enacted together. Under the consumer regulation model proposed by Bibas,
and following his recommendations, sentencing commissions could provide
individualized PSRs for defendants facing serious felony charges. With the
assistance of the American Law Institute or Uniform Law Commission
working in conjunction with state sentencing commissions much of the “boiler
plate” of these reports could be prepared in advance and made publicly
available. The courts and legislature could establish appropriate timelines for
the process including: (1) when the parties should receive the reports; (2) how
long from receipt until the defendant must have an official advisory meeting
with his or her counsel regarding the report; and (3) how much time must
elapse from the post-advisory meeting until the defendant may appear before
the court for the plea hearing (i.e. the “cooling-off period”). At the plea
hearing, heeding Pratt’s exhortations against complacency, the trial court
would have an enhanced duty to give any additional judicial warnings required
by the jurisdiction’s rules of criminal procedure. Since the PSR would form the

240. Bibas, supra note 13, at 1155.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1156 (citing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 250–51 (2008)).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1158.
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basis of the plea, the judge could inquire extensively into the contents of the
PSR, the defendant’s understanding of those contents, what advice was or was
not given by the defendant’s attorney, etc. If, at any point, the judge had reason
to doubt the validity of the defendant’s plea or the adequacy of his or her
attorney’s counsel, the judge could impose an additional advisory meeting and
cooling-off period. If, on the other hand, the judge was satisfied by what he or
she heard, the judge could instruct the defendant to enter his or her plea and
ratify it by signing the document, effectively charging the defendant with
knowledge of its contents. Taking these proposals together would not create a
perfect system, but implementing these ideas into a modified colloquy would
provide the plea judge with additional resources to ensure the defendant’s plea
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Given the realities of the plea process
in the current criminal justice system, it is unlikely we can maintain the
procedural protections afforded to the accused by our Constitution without
enacting similar unified reforms.
E.

Illustration: Applying the Proposed Reforms to Taylor

It is not difficult to see how the proposals outlined above would apply in
Taylor. After he was charged and indicted, if he preferred to plead guilty,
Taylor would have been provided with a plain English document in advance of
his plea hearing. This plea document would include a PSR provided by the
Missouri Sentencing Commission, containing the charges against him, the
mandatory minimum sentence for each charge, and the “truly clear”
consequences of a guilty plea and conviction on each charge.245 Most
importantly for Taylor and other defendants facing a possible death sentence,
this pre-plea document would contain an overview and explanation of his
sentencing options, including section 565.006.2 and the procedure for
imposing the death penalty in Missouri. Taylor then would have a chance to
review this document with his defense attorneys, ask questions of them about
its provisions, and get their advice. Taylor would then have to wait the
mandatory “cooling-off period,” perhaps as short as seventy-two hours, before
a plea hearing. During the plea hearing the judge would bear the enhanced duty
of probing the validity of Taylor’s plea and assessing what Taylor’s counsel
did and did not discuss with him, including his three sentencing options. The
plea judge would also be responsible for administering any explicit judicial
warnings and could provide for an additional cooling-off period if dissatisfied
with the proceedings, paying close attention to the “human element” of the
plea. Had these procedures been followed, it is reasonably probable that at
245. Currently, judges receive Sentencing Assessment Reports prepared by probation officers
employed by the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole. Telephone Interview with Michael A.
Wolff, Former Missouri Supreme Court Justice and Professor of Law at Saint Louis University
School of Law (Apr. 6, 2012).
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least one of the individuals involved—whether it was Taylor himself, one of
his two attorneys, the prosecution, or the plea judge—would have noticed and
mentioned the sentencing option provided by section 565.006.2. Even if it was
not mentioned on record at the plea colloquy, the procedural reforms suggested
above could be deemed sufficient to charge Taylor with knowledge of section
565.006.2. Taylor’s signature on the plea document would render it a
permanent record of what he “knew” when he entered his plea. Either way, at
least with respect to the effectiveness of his counsel and validity of his plea,
Taylor’s sentence would have been resolved without twenty-plus years of
litigation, safeguarding his constitutional rights while providing resolution to
his victim’s family.
CONCLUSION
To the extent that Padilla signals the Court’s willingness to more
vigorously enforce criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, it represents a hopeful step towards meaningful
constitutional protections in the plea process under which the vast majority of
defendants in our criminal justice system are convicted. The opinion itself
supports this hope. While it is currently uncertain how broadly its holding will
be applied, recent decisions by state and federal courts across the country
indicate we are just beginning to see the impact of Padilla on the plea process.
In Missouri, a persuasive case has been made for applying Padilla to
sentencing consequences generally based in part on the similar characteristics
such consequences share with deportation. The case of Michael Anthony
Taylor offers further support for applying Padilla to sentencing consequences
in Missouri and is particularly compelling with respect to such application in
capital cases. Following the rationale of Padilla and Webb, the failure of
Taylor’s attorneys to inform him of the truly clear consequences of his guilty
plea should have amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. It is reasonably
probable Taylor suffered sufficient prejudice as a result of his attorneys’
deficient counsel to satisfy the Strickland standard. However, the deficiencies
in Taylor’s representation that make it illustrative of the need to apply Padilla
also illustrate the dilemma such application would pose for an already fragile
public defender system.
This necessary application of constitutional protections faces a potentially
insurmountable hurdle given the state of the public defender system in
Missouri and across the nation. The system in its current form may simply be
incapable of accommodating the added burden. However, this burden could be
mitigated by reforming the plea process to accord a consumer protection model
and to share the burden among state trial courts, sentencing commissions, and
defense attorneys. The adoption of a unified reform effort, while not perfect,
should enable the criminal justice system to better protect defendants’
constitutional rights, conserve judicial resources, and provide swifter
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resolution to victims’ families. In the case of Michael Anthony Taylor it would
have accomplished all three tasks.
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